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Abstract
Background: When we observe an individual performing a motor act (e.g. grasping a cup) we get two types of information
on the basis of how the motor act is done and the context: what the agent is doing (i.e. grasping) and the intention
underlying it (i.e. grasping for drinking). Here we examined the temporal dynamics of the brain activations that follow the
observation of a motor act and underlie the observer’s capacity to understand what the agent is doing and why.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Volunteers were presented with two-frame video-clips. The first frame (T0) showed an
object with or without context; the second frame (T1) showed a hand interacting with the object. The volunteers were
instructed to understand the intention of the observed actions while their brain activity was recorded with a high-density
128-channel EEG system. Visual event-related potentials (VEPs) were recorded time-locked with the frame showing the
hand-object interaction (T1). The data were analyzed by using electrical neuroimaging, which combines a cluster analysis
performed on the group-averaged VEPs with the localization of the cortical sources that give rise to different spatio-
temporal states of the global electrical field. Electrical neuroimaging results revealed four major steps: 1) bilateral posterior
cortical activations; 2) a strong activation of the left posterior temporal and inferior parietal cortices with almost a complete
disappearance of activations in the right hemisphere; 3) a significant increase of the activations of the right temporo-parietal
region with simultaneously co-active left hemispheric sources, and 4) a significant global decrease of cortical activity
accompanied by the appearance of activation of the orbito-frontal cortex.
Conclusions/Significance: We conclude that the early striking left hemisphere involvement is due to the activation of a
lateralized action-observation/action execution network. The activation of this lateralized network mediates the
understanding of the goal of object-directed motor acts (mirror mechanism). The successive right hemisphere activation
indicates that this hemisphere plays an important role in understanding the intention of others.
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Introduction
Although humans interact mostly verbally, non-verbal interac-
tions are also fundamental in social life. We continuously observe
our conspecifics and from their facial expression, body posture,
and the way in which they act upon objects we are able to
understand their emotions, mood and intentions [1,2,3,4].
What are the mechanisms that allow us to become aware of the
mental states of others? There is a long tradition claiming that
humans understand what others are doing by means of their
capability to attribute a causal role to others’ internal mental states
[5,6].
In recent years, however, neurophysiological evidence has
shown that the actions of others can be understood without
exploiting these meta-representational abilities. Single neuron
recordings in the monkey and brain imaging and electrophysio-
logical non-invasive techniques (Transcranial Magnetic Stimula-
tion, TMS; Electroencephalogram, EEG; Magneto-Encephalo-
gram, MEG) in humans showed that primates are endowed with a
mechanism -the mirror mechanism- that matches the observed
motor acts done by others on the observer’s motor representations
of the same motor acts [7,8,9,10]. Because the observer knows his/
her own actions and the way to achieve them, the occurrence of a
neural pattern similar to that the observer generates during
voluntarily motor acts enables him/her to recognize the motor act
he/she is observing.
These data do not deny, of course, that meta-representational
abilities might play a role in action understanding or in reasoning
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indicate, however, that mentalizing is neither the sole, nor the
primary way of understanding others’ actions.
While the early studies on mirror neurons in monkeys [17,18]
described a mechanism allowing the observer to understand what
an individual was doing in a given moment (e.g. grasping, ripping,
holding), more recent data indicate that the mirror mechanism
might also account for the capacity to understand why the agent
was doing it, that is the agent’s motor intention. Fogassi et al. (2005)
showed that, in the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) of the monkey, the
majority of motor neurons discharge during a motor act (e.g.,
grasping) only if this act is embedded in a specific chain of motor
acts (e.g., grasping-for-eating). Most interestingly, many of these
‘‘action-constrained’’ motor neurons have mirror properties firing
in relation to the observation of a motor act provided that this act
is part of a specific action [19]. By virtue of these ‘‘action-
constrained’’ mirror neurons and their motor connections, the
observation of the initial motor act of an action evokes in the
observer’s brain an internal motor copy of the whole action that
the agent is going to perform, and this enables her/him to
understand the intention underlying the observed motor act.
Brain imaging data indicate that the mirror mechanism also
plays a role in intention understanding in humans [20,21].
Furthermore, by using EMG, it has been shown that the
observation of the initial motor act (e.g. grasping) of an intentional
action (grasping a piece of food for eating it) evokes in human
observers a motor copy of the action the agent is going to perform.
This motor copy allows the observer to grasp the agent’s intention,
without bringing into plays specialized inferential processes of
mentalistic rationalization [22].
The existence of two separate, although interconnected,
mechanisms underlying the what- and why- of understanding
was confirmed by a behavioral study in humans. Typically
developing children (TD) and children with autism were asked to
recognize an everyday life motor act and, in a subsequent
condition, to tell the experimenter why the observed motor act was
performed [23]. The data showed that while TD children had no
problems with both tasks, children with autism recognized what
another individual was doing [21,24,25,26,27], but frequently
failed in understanding why that individual was doing it.
This dissociation between the capacity to understand the what
and why of a motor act suggests that, even when action and
intention understanding does not require specialized inferential
reasoning on others’ mental states, different, although intercon-
nected neural mechanisms, are involved in the brain of the
observer. Nothing, however, is known on the temporal-spatial events
leading from the observation of a simple motor act, like grasping a
mug, to the understanding of the intention underlying it.
The aim of the present study was to describe the temporal
sequence of brain activations that allow the observation of a motor
act done by another individual and underlie the observer’s
capacity to understand what the agent is doing and why. To this
purpose we presented scenes where the goal and intention of the
observed motor acts could be understood on the basis of the
relation between a hand and an object or by the context in which
the motor acts were performed. Furthermore, in some cases the
purpose of the hand motor act was transparent, while in others it
was opaque and could be only guessed.
As a technique, we used high-density electrical neuroimaging,
which combined a cluster-analysis of brain topography (a
technique elaborated by Lehmann, [28]) with inverse solutions
[29,30,31,32]. This technique has the advantage of providing high
temporal and a relatively high spatial resolution about stimulus
information processing by unraveling the temporal sequence of the
brain topographies (brain microstates) that are stable after a
stimulus onset and the spatial location of the brain generators of
these brain topographies [31,32,33,34,35]. This technique has
proven to be a reliable research tool during the past decade
[35,36,37,38,39,40].
Materials and Methods
Participants
The experiments were carried out on 20 volunteers (fifteen men,
five women; mean age of 24 years old; age range of 18–44 years
old). All were right-handed, as ascertained by the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory [41]. They had normal or corrected-to-
normal visual acuity. None had prior or current neurological or
psychiatric impairment. Prior to participation, all participants
provided a written informed consent to take part in the study that
has been approved by the University of California Santa Barbara’s
Institutional Review Board.
Stimulus sequence
Participants viewed a series of two-frame video-clips (Figure 1A).
Every video clip consisted of the following sequence: a fixation
cross (150 ms), an object without context or an object within two
different contexts (T0; 500 ms), and a hand-on-object action with
or without contexts (T1; 2000 ms; Figure 1B). T1 (hand-object
interaction) showed a hand grasping or touching the object.
Because of this sequence, all participants identified the hand-object
interaction as the initial part of an action (see Debriefing session).
The gap between the first (T0) and the second (T1) stimulus was
very short (one refreshed screen, see [35,42]). In this way the
continuous images sequence determined the perception of an
action. The presentation of the each couple of stimuli (T0 and T1)
was interspersed with the presentation of a black screen with a
fixation cross in its center (Figure 1B). Inter-trial intervals (ITI)
ranged from 1000 to 2000 ms with steps of 100 ms varying
randomly in different trials (ITI=1000, 1100, 1200, …. 2000).
Paradigm
Participants were tested in two main experimental conditions:
‘‘No Context’’ (Figure 1A, 1) and ‘‘Context’’ (Figure 1A, 2).
In the ‘‘No Context’’ condition three types of hand-object
interaction (T1), differing for the intention underlying them, were
used. These three types of hand-object interactions were the
following: a) a right hand grasping an object for purpose of use (Use
grip, Ug); b) a right hand grasping an object for moving it
(Transport grip, Tg); c) a right hand touching an object. In this last
case no obvious purpose of the observed motor act could be
recognized (Simple contact, Sc). Exemplars of the three kinds of
hand-object interactions are shown in Figure 1A1.
In the ‘‘Context’’ condition, the participants saw an establishing
scene (T0 frame) suggestive of a certain type of behavior (Figure 1,
A2), and subsequently a hand-object interaction (T1) embedded in
that scene. There were two types of hand-object interactions. The
first showed a hand grasping an object with the grip being the one
typically employed for the use of that object. However, the context
in which the grip was performed indicated whether the use
interpretation was the correct one (Figure 1, A2, U) or whether the
most likely intention of the agent was that of moving the object
towards another position (Figure 1, A2, T). The second type of
hand-object interaction consisted of a hand touching an object in
two different contexts (Figure 1, A2; use context, simple contact,
Usc; transport context, simple contact, Tsc). In neither context,
the purpose of touching could be derived from the hand-object
interaction.
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During the EEG recordings, the participants received explicit
instructions to observe carefully the video-clips, and to try to
understand the intention behind the observed hand-object
interactions (T1) for both the ‘‘Context’’ and ‘‘No Context’’
conditions. In order to avoid eye movements, participants were
asked to fixate the central visual cross during the whole
experiment. Before EEG recordings, every participant was
familiarized with all actions for 3 minutes. Participants were
informed that some of the hand-object interactions could have the
following intentional meaning: to transport the grasped object or
to use the grasped object. Participants were also informed that
some of the hand-object interactions could be devoid of an
immediate intentional meaning. During EEG recordings, partic-
ipants were required to not give any overt responses. No reaction
times were recorded during the EEG session to avoid any motor
interference with EEG activity.
Debriefing session
At the end of the experimental session all participants were
debriefed. During this debriefing session, behavioral responses
were collected by asking participants to write down their responses
on a piece of paper. This information was collected for every set of
actions and every condition. As in the EEG session, the
participants were instructed to try to understand the intention
behind the observed hand-object interactions (T1) for both the
‘‘Context’’ and ‘‘No Context’’ conditions. Similarly, they were also
informed that some of the hand-object interactions could have the
intentional meaning of ‘‘transporting’’ the grasped object or of
‘‘using’’ it. Participants were also told that some of the hand-object
Figure 1. Stimuli and experimental design. A. Exemplars of the used stimuli. 1: No context condition. Participants observed two pictures in
sequence. The first showed an object (e.g., a cup) without any context, the second a hand interacting with that object. Three types of hand-object
interactions were presented: a hand grasping the object as for using it (Ug); a hand grasping an object as for moving it (Tg); a hand touching an
object without any obvious purpose (Sc). 2: ‘‘Context’’ condition. As in the previous condition, participants saw two pictures in sequence. The first
showed an object embedded in a context (upper row). The second one showed a hand grasping that object. The context allowed the observer to
decide whether the agent’s intention was to use the object or to move it (U and T, middle row). A simple contact of the hand with the object was also
presented in both the contexts (Usc: use context, simple contact; Tsc; transport context, simple contact; upper right, lower row). B. Procedure. Each
trial consisted of the following sequence: fixation cross; object alone or within a context hand-object interaction; fixation cross. The sequence shown
in figure illustrates the use grip (Ug) in No context condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012160.g001
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meaning (i.e., simple contacts: Sc, Tsc or Usc).
The behavioral results showed that all stimuli that enabled the
observer to understand the agent’s intentions were correctly rated.
Specifically, in the ‘‘No Context’’ condition 99% of the responses
of the participants correctly indicated the intention behind the use
grip (Ug), and 98% percent of the responses of the participants
correctly indicated the intention behind the transport grip (Tg). No
difference was observed between Ug and Tg (p=0.93). Also, 100%
of the responses of the participants correctly indicated the hand-
object interactions that were devoid of a clear intentional meaning
(i.e., Sc) as such.
In the ‘‘Context’’ condition, 100% of the responses of the
participants correctly indicated the stimuli for U, T, Usc, and Tsc.
A twelve-point Likert Scale ascertained participant’s response
certainty. In the ‘‘No Context’’ condition, the averaged certainty
scores were 10.88 for Ug and 9.67 for Tg and. A ceiling effect (i.e.,
maximum score) was observed for Sc. In other words, simple
contact stimuli were perfectly identified as being ‘‘simple touches
with no obvious intentional meaning’’. In the ‘‘Context’’
condition, the averaged certainty scores were 11 for the use of
the object (U) and 10 for the transport of the object (T). No
significant difference was observed between the two conditions. A
ceiling effect (i.e., maximum score) was also observed in the
‘‘Context’’ condition for Usc and Tsc i.e., simple contact stimuli
were perfectly identified as being ‘‘simple touches with no obvious
intentional meaning’’.
Stimuli
In the ‘‘No Context’’ condition, 20 grasping actions (10 Ug and
10 Tg) and 10 touching actions (Sc) were presented intermixed
among them. All actions were performed on the same 10 objects:
screwdriver, banana, phone, glasses, pencil, coffee cup, scissors,
hammer, pizza, and iron.
In the ‘‘Context’’ condition, 12 grasping actions (6 U and 6 T)
and 12 simple contact actions (6 Usc and 6 Tsc) were presented,
intermixed among them. The actions were performed on 6 objects
that were also employed in the ‘‘No Context’’ condition. They
were: coffee cup, scissors, pizza, phone, hammer, and iron. The
reason for this selection was that grasping actions on the six chosen
objects could be performed plausibly within two different
ecological contextual backgrounds.
The grasping presented in the ‘‘Context’’ condition was of one
type only, and namely the use grip (Ug) of the ‘‘No Context’’
condition. Ug was chosen because is the prototypical grip for a
given object. Using the same grip in the ‘‘Context’’ and ‘‘No
Context’’ condition allowed us to see how the context influenced
the intention comprehension during the observation of the same
motor act.
Apparatus
Visual stimuli were presented on a PC computer using Cogent
2000 (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent2000/index.html) run-
ning in Matlab 7.0.1 under Windows XP. Participants were
comfortably seated 150 cm away from a PC computer screen in
which video clips were presented centrally. A total of three
experimental blocks of ‘‘No Context’’ condition and five
experimental blocks of ‘‘Context’’ condition were randomly
presented throughout the whole experimental session. In each
condition (‘‘No Context’’, and ‘‘Context’’), grasping and simple
contact actions were intermixed. A total of 240 trials were
administered per condition (‘‘No Context’’, and ‘‘Context’’), which
took up to a total of 40 minutes including breaks between each
block.
Electrophysiological recordings
Electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 128 AgCl
carbon-fiber coated electrodes using an Electric Geodesic Sensor
NetH (GSN300; Electrical Geodesic Inc., Oregon; http://www.
egi.com/). EEG was digitized at 500 Hz, and band-width filtered
at 0.01–200 Hz, with the vertex electrode (Cz) serving as an on-
line recording reference.
Data Analysis
First-level electrophysiological data analysis. Electro-
physiological data were first analyzed at the individual level.
Raw data of each participant were imported and analyzed in
Cartool software (version 3.33; http://brainmapping.unige.ch/
Cartool.htm). All trials were submitted to an automated threshold
rejection criterion of 100 mV and visually inspected for oculomotor
(saccades and blinks), muscles, and other artifacts. Channels with
corrupted signals were interpolated using a three-dimensional
spline procedure [43]. Surviving epochs of EEG (from 2100 to
500 ms post-stimulus onset) were averaged for each experimental
condition for each participant to calculate the visual event-related
potentials (VEPs). Two VEPs were calculated for each participant:
the first was time-locked to the onset of the first presented picture
(T0, i.e., the picture showing objects with no hand-object
interaction), the second with the onset the second presented
picture (T1; i.e., the picture showing a hand-object interaction).
For the data time-locked to the first picture (T0), three VEPs were
computed for each participant, one for each condition: 1) object
without context; 2) object within a context suggesting the object
use; 3) object within context suggesting object transport (See
Supporting Information, File S1, and Figure S1 for further details).
For data time-locked to the second picture (T1), seven VEPs were
computed for each participant, one for each of the three types of
stimuli of the ‘‘No Context’’ conditions (Ug, Tg, and Sc) and one
for each of the four types of stimuli in the ‘‘Context’’ condition (U,
T, Usc, and Tsc).
These VEP data were baseline corrected from 2100 to 0 and
band-pass filtered between 1 and 30 Hz. Then, VEP data were
recalculated off-line against the average reference, and normalized
to their mean global field power (i.e., GFP [44,45]). This GFP
measure, first introduced by Lehman and Skrandies (1980), is
equivalent to the spatial standard deviation of the scalp electric
field calculated as the root mean square across the average-
referenced electrode values at a given instant in time [34]. GFP
yields larger values for stronger electric fields [32,44].
All individual VEP data were then group-averaged using the
following procedure. First, three group-averaged VEPs were
computed across participants for data time-locked to the first
picture (T0; one group-averaged VEP for object without context;
one for object within a context suggesting object use; and one for
object within context suggesting object transport). Then, seven
group-averaged VEPs were computed across participants for data
time-locked to the second picture (T1; one for each of the three
types of stimuli of the ‘‘No Context’’ condition (Ug, Tg, and Sc)
and one for each of the four types of stimuli in the ‘‘Context’’
condition; U, T, Usc, and Tsc). Because the main aim of the
present experiment was to determine the temporal dynamics
leading to the understanding of others’ motor intentions (why), we
focused on the grand-averaged VEPs synchronized to the onset of
the second picture (T1) of the video clips, i.e., picture showing the
hand-object interaction.
Second-level electrophysiological data analysis. Group-
averaged VEP data were subsequently processed using a space-
oriented brain electric field analysis [28]. This method is based on
the notion of functional brain microstates introduced in the 1980’s by
Understanding Intentions
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 August 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 8 | e12160Lehman [28]. It is based on the empirical observation that the
electric brain activity does not vary randomly over time after a
stimulus onset, but, rather, that some brain topographies remain
stable over time (from tens to hundred milliseconds, [33]). Each
stable brain topography (named brain microstate) is sustained by a
specific brain network and reflects a specific functional brain state
[28,32,33].
A way to identify the microstates is by carrying out a cluster
analysis performed on the group-averaged VEPs [46]. This
analysis was applied here on the group-averaged VEPs to
determine the existence of stable microstates in the different
experimental conditions. To identify the start and the end of each
microstate, a standard pattern analysis was employed using the
grand-mean VEPs of each condition [47]. This cluster analysis
uses a hierarchical agglomerative cluster-algorithm to identify the
predominant topographies (i.e., the microstates) and their
sequence within a data set. A modified Krzanowski-Lai criterion
determined the optimal number of microstates that explains the
whole group-averaged data set (i.e., the minimal number that best
accounts for the data set). Importantly, this cluster analysis is
reference-free, and insensitive to amplitude modulation of the
same scalp potential field across conditions, since normalized maps
are compared. As in previous studies [34,36,37,38,47], this cluster
analysis was performed across time and experimental conditions in
order to determine whether and when different experimental
conditions engaged distinct configurations of intracranial genera-
tors. Then, the appearance and sequence of the microstates
identified in the group-averaged VEP data was statistically verified
in the single-subject VEPs of the individual participants by means
of a fitting procedure based on the spatial correlation between the
template brain topographies obtained from the group-averaged
level and the single-subject VEP data [48]. In other words, each
microstate was compared with the moment-by-moment scalp
topography of the individual participants’ VEPs from each
condition by strength-independent spatial correlation [34]. Thus,
for each time point of the individual participant’s VEPs, the scalp
topography was compared to all microstates and was labeled
according to the one with which it best correlated spatially [34,48].
Because the pre-stimulus period (2100 to 0) was baseline
corrected, we restricted our microstate analyses to the initial
500 ms post-stimulus period in terms of the spatio-temporal
characteristics of the global electric field on the scalp (brain
microstates). The optimal number of microstates was fitted into the
original data for each subject, using a competitive fitting procedure
[38,49]. From this ‘‘fitting’’ procedure, we determined the total
amount of time (i.e., duration) a given topography was observed
for a given condition across participants. These latter values,
which represent the frequency with which a given microstate was
observed within a given time period for each experimental
condition, were then subjected to a repeated measure ANOVA. It
is important to note that this labeling procedure is not exclusive,
such that a given period of the VEP for a given participant and
stimulus condition is often labeled with multiple microstates. As
such, the results of the labeling reveal if the VEP from a given
experimental condition is more often described by one microstate
vs. another, and therefore if different generator configurations
better account for particular experimental conditions. Results were
accepted as significant at p,0.05.
As a final step, we estimated the sources in the brain that gave
rise to each of the microstates, using a distributed linear inverse
solution. The inverse matrices applied here were based on a low-
resolution brain electromagnetic tomography (LORETA) model
of the unknown current density in the brain [29,50]. Since
LORETA belongs to the class of distributed inverse solutions, it is
capable of dealing with multiple simultaneously active sources of a
priori unknown location. LORETA method has been quoted in
several publications and has been validated theoretically and
empirically [30,46,50]. The applied version of LORETA was used
with a lead field (solution space) calculated on a realistic head
model using SMAC [51] on an average brain model provided by
the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI). Our head model
included 3005 solution points, selected from a 66666 mm grid
equally distributed within the gray matter. Source estimations
were rendered on the MNI/McGill average standard brain
supplied by Cartool. As an output, this approach provides current
density measures (in mA/mm
3) at each solution point. The results
of the abovementioned topographic pattern analysis defined the
time period (i.e., microstate) when intracranial sources were
estimated with the distributed source inverse solution (LORETA).
Although LORETA provides one current source density maxi-
mum for each microstate, it may also, as a distributed inverse
solution, detect additional simultaneously active sources at other
solution points. These distributed activations may be more or less
intense across microstates. To detect these distributed activations
over all solution points, we first performed a qualitative visual
inspection of all solution points. Then, to statistically validate
whether (or not) these qualitative modulations of brain activations
were significantly different between microstates, we conducted a
supplementary statistical analysis. In this supplementary analysis,
we contrasted the scalar values from the source estimations over
every time period of one microstate (e.g., Microstate 1) for each
participant (N=20 participants) with the scalar values from the
source estimations over the time period of another microstate (e.g.,
Microstate 2) for each participant (N=20 participants) using a
paired t-test (Bonferroni-corrected). These statistical analyses of
source estimations were performed by first averaging the VEP data
over such time periods of microstates in order to generate a single
data point per period for each participant to increase the signal-to-
noise ratio. Then the inverse solutions were estimated for each of
the 3005 solution points. Only solution points with p#0.05
(t(19)$2.09) were considered significant. In addition, we applied a
cluster threshold of .10 contiguous activated solution points.
Results
No Context condition
Figure 2 shows the average VEPs elicited by the presentation of
the three classes of stimuli in ‘‘No Context’’ condition: Use grip
(Ug), Transport grip (Tg), and Simple contact (Sc).
The hierarchical cluster analysis of the VEP topographies in this
‘‘No Context’’ condition identified five different microstates in the
500 ms post-stimulus period that explained 96.41% of variance in
the collective data set. The windows of occurrence for these stable
topographies corresponded to the following time intervals:
Microstate 1: 0–120 ms; Microstate 2: 122–200 ms; Microstate
3: 202–230 ms; Microstate 4: 232–320 ms; Microstate 5: 322–
500 ms.
The first two microstates (Figure 2 A, pale gray and dark gray
bars respectively) did not significantly differ one from another as a
function of the type of stimuli: Microstate 1=119 ms for Ug,
114 ms for Tg, and 114 ms for Sc; F(2,38)=3; p=0.06;
Microstate 2=65 ms for Ug, 70 ms for Tg, and 66 ms for Sc;
F(2,38)=0.82, p=0.45. As shown on Figure 2A, this was not the
case for the next microstate, Microstate 3 (Figure 2A, blue bars).
To statistically validate whether this Microstate 3 differed
according to stimulus category, the values related to its duration
(i.e., values that represent the frequency with which this given
microstate was observed within this given time period for each
Understanding Intentions
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 August 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 8 | e12160Figure 2. No Context condition. Visual event-related potentials (VEPs) and brain microstates. A. Group-averaged VEPs elicited by the presentation
of use grip (Ug), transport grip (Tg) and simple contact (Sc) stimuli. Stimulus exemplars of the three classes of stimuli are shown on the left side of the
panel. The topographic cluster analysis identified five distinct microstates (colored bars) in the 500 ms following stimulus presentation. Two
microstates (blue and green bars, respectively), although present following presentation of all three types of stimuli, had different duration
depending upon the stimulus type. B. Segmentation maps of the two microstates (Microstate blue frame, Microstate green frame) that showed
different duration according to the presented stimulus type. The maps are plotted with the nasion upward and right ear on the right side (scale
indicated). Blue areas depict negative potentials and red areas depict positive potentials. C. The statistical significance of Microstate 3 and 4 was
tested by means of a fitting procedure based on the spatial correlation between microstates obtained from the group-averaged VEPs and the single-
subject VEP data. Blue columns: Microstate 3. Note the more prolonged activity for use and transport grip (Ug and Tg,) than for simple contact actions
(Sc). Green columns: Microstate 4. Note the shorter activity in response to use grip (Ug) than in response to the other two stimuli. Error bars indicate
standard deviation. Asterisks indicate significant differences (**, P,0.01) between conditions for a given microstate. D. Localization of the intracranial
brain generators as estimated with LORETA inverse solution. Twelve transaxial brain sections are presented. Their Talairach z values, from left to right
and from top to bottom, are: 72, 64, 49, 42, 31, 22, 16, 7, 26, 210, 232, 238. Group-averaged source estimations were calculated over each time
interval and all conditions. The localizations are framed with the same color code as the corresponding microstates in A. E. Segmentation maps of the
all microstates. Conventions as in B.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012160.g002
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ANOVA with the within-subject factor of stimulus category
(Figure 2A). This ANOVA revealed that the duration of this
Microstate 3 was significantly longer in Ug=28 ms and
Tg=26 ms (i.e. during processing of stimuli showing hand
grasping) than in Sc (i.e., in the case of simple contact with the
object; Sc=18 ms; F(2,38)=4.05; p=0.03).
A similar ANOVA performed on the following microstate,
Microstate 4 (Figure 2A, green bars), also showed a significant
different duration according to the presented stimuli (F(2,38)=5.3,
p=0.009). More precisely, Microstate 4 was significantly shorter
for Ug (i.e. for the grip that is typically used to interact with the
presented object) than for Tg (i.e. the grip used to move the
object), and Sc. Its duration for Ug, Tg, and Sc was 59 ms, 76 ms
and 84 ms, respectively. Finally, the last microstate, Microstate 5
(Figure 2A, yellow bars), did not significantly differ in function of
the presented stimuli.
Figure 2B shows the segmentation maps of Microstates 3 and 4
(blue and green frames, respectively) as revealed by the
topographic pattern analysis across the group-averaged VEPs of
all three classes of used stimuli. Blue areas depict negative
potentials, while red areas depict positive potentials. The reliability
of these microstates at the group-averaged level was assessed at the
individual level using a fitting procedure (Figure 2C, see Methods
for further details)
Next, we estimated the active intracranial generators of every
microstate identified above in the ‘‘No Context’’ condition
(Figure 2D). To do so, we used a distributed source inverse
solution (LORETA), and applied it to the topographic configu-
rations identified in the VEP analysis. This approach allows us to
define the brain areas activated in the different microstates. The
active areas are shown in Figure 2D. The color scale (Figure 2 D,
right part) indicates the current source density.
During Microstate 1 (pale grey frame) LORETA distributed
source inverse solution revealed a bilateral activation of the
occipital, posterior temporal and inferior parietal cortices with a
current source density maximum located in the left middle
temporal sulcus (current source density maximum: 248, 261, 6 x,
y, z; Talairach coordinates).
The next microstate (Microstate 2, dark grey frame) was
characterized by a current source density maximum in the caudal
part of the left inferior parietal lobule (current source density
maximum: 250, 258, 23 x, y, z; Talairach coordinates). Visual
inspection of the other neural generators in these two microstates
(Microstate 1 and Microstate 2) indicates a marked decrease of
activations of the right hemisphere in Microstate 2 relative to those
observed for Microstate 1 with a simultaneous accentuation of
activations of the left hemisphere activity and in particular of the
inferior parietal lobule. To statistically validate whether (or not)
this qualitative decrease of activation in the right hemisphere in
Microstate 2 was significantly different from Microstate 1, we
conducted a paired t-test over the possible 3005 brain solution
points (see Method section for further details). More precisely, we
contrasted the scalar values from the source estimations over the
0–120 ms period (i.e., time period of Microstate 1) for each
participant (N=20 participants) with the scalar values from the
source estimations over the 122–200 ms period (i.e., Microstate 2
time period) for each participant (N=20 participants) using a
paired t-test (Bonferroni-corrected) and applying a brain solution
point-level significance threshold of t19$2.09 (p#0.05) and a
cluster threshold of .10 contiguous activated brain solution
points. Estimated sources in right hemisphere were significantly
stronger in Microstate 1 period of time as opposed to Microstate 2
period of time (t=4.84 in right inferior parietal lobule; t=2.50 in
right superior temporal cortex). Also, estimated sources in left
inferior parietal lobule were significantly stronger in Microstate 2
period of time as opposed to Microstate 1 period of time (t=6.79).
LORETA estimation of the active intracranial generators of
Microstate 3 (blue frame) showed a current source density
maximum located in the left inferior parietal lobule (current
source density maximum: 249, 263, 17 x, y, z; Talairach
coordinates). Visual inspection of the other neural generators of
Microstate 3 revealed a right hemisphere parietal activation,
which was not present in Microstate 2. To statistically validate
whether (or not) this right brain activation was significantly
different between Microstate 3 and Microstate 2, we contrasted
the scalar values from the source estimations over the time period
of Microstate 3 for each participant with the scalar values from the
source estimations over the time period of Microstate 2 for each
participant over the possible 3005 brain solution points (using a
paired t-test, Bonferroni-corrected; with the following significance
criteria: t19$2.09 (p#0.05) and cluster threshold of .10
contiguous activated brain solution points). Estimated sources
confirmed a significant increase of right hemispheric activations in
the inferior parietal (t=3.44) and posterior temporal (t=3.30)
cortices in Microstate 3 period of time as compared to Microstate
2 period of time.
LORETA estimation of the active intracranial generators of
Microstate 4 (green frame) also revealed a current source density
maximum in the left inferior parietal lobule (current source density
maximum: 248, 262, 12 x, y, z, Talairach coordinates). In
addition, visual inspection of the other activations found in
Microstate 4 revealed also a clear right inferior parietal and
posterior temporal activation, and a bilateral activation of the
frontal lobes. To statistically validate these visual observations, we
contrasted the scalar values from the source estimations over the
time period of Microstate 4 for each participant with the scalar
values from the source estimations over the time period of
Microstate 3 for each participant over the possible 3005 brain
solution points (using a paired t-test, Bonferroni-corrected; with
the following significance criteria: t19$2.09 (p#0.05), and cluster
threshold of .10 contiguous activated brain solution points).
Estimated sources confirmed significantly stronger right hemi-
spheric activations in the inferior parietal (t=2.42) and the
superior parietal areas (t=3.65) in Microstate 4 compared to
Microstate 3. Also, although significantly stronger activations were
present bilaterally in the frontal lobe in Microstate 4 (compared to
Microstate 3), these activations did not pass our cluster threshold
of .10 contiguous activated brain solution points (right frontal
activations: t=2.80 with 3 activated solution points; left frontal
activations: t=2.25 with 2 activated solution points). Finally,
estimated sources in left inferior parietal lobule were significantly
stronger in Microstate 3 period of time as opposed to Microstate 4
period of time (t=3.04).
Finally, LORETA estimation of the active intracranial gener-
ators of Microstate 5 (yellow frame) showed a current source
density maximum in the left orbito-frontal cortex (current source
density maximum: 23, 38, 27 x, y, z; Talairach coordinates). A
visual inspection of Microstate 5 inverse solutions revealed a
decrease of all the other activations mentioned previously. To
statistically validate these visual observations, we contrasted the
scalar values from the source estimations over the time period of
Microstate 5 for each participant with the scalar values from the
source estimations over the time period of Microstate 4 for each
participant over the possible 3005 brain solution points (using a
paired t-test, Bonferroni-corrected; with the following significance
criteria: t19$2.09 (p#0.05), and cluster threshold of .10
contiguous activated brain solution points). Estimated sources
Understanding Intentions
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Microstate 4 in comparison with Microstate 5, notably in the right
inferior parietal (t=3.44), posterior temporal (t=4.20), and frontal
(t=3.93) areas. Also, significantly stronger left hemispheric
activations were present in Microstate 4 (compared to Microstate
5), notably in the left inferior parietal (t=3.04), posterior temporal
(t=2.51), and frontal (t=2.78) lobes.
Context condition
Figure 3A shows the average VEPs elicited by the presentation
of the four classes of stimuli in the ‘‘Context’’ condition: Use (U),
Transport (T), and Simple contact in use and transport scenes (Usc
and Tsc).
The hierarchical cluster analysis of the VEP topographies in this
‘‘Context’’ condition identified six stable microstates in the 500 ms
post-stimulus period that explained 96.54% of variance in the
collective data set. While the first three microstates (0–120 ms;
122–170 ms; 172–208 ms) were identical across the four classes of
stimuli (Figure 3A pale gray, dark gray, and orange bars,
respectively), the next microstate, Microstate 4 (from 210–
230 ms; Figure 3A blue bars), was evident only for U and T
classes of stimuli. To statistically validate whether this Microstate 4
differed according to stimulus category, the values related to its
duration were subjected to a repeated measure ANOVA with the
within-subject factor of stimulus category (Figure 3A). This
ANOVA revealed that the duration of Microstate 4 was
significantly longer for the VEPs of U and T classes of stimuli
Figure 3. Context condition. Visual event-related potentials (VEPs) and brain microstates. A Group-averaged VEPs elicited by the presentation of
hand grasping stimuli in use (U) and transport (T) context, and by the presentation of simple contact stimuli in the same two contexts (Usc and Tsc).
Stimulus exemplars of the four classes of stimuli are shown on the left side of the A panel. The topographic cluster analysis identified six distinct
microstates (colored bars) in the 500 ms following stimulus presentation. Two microstates (blue and green bars, respectively), although present
following presentation of all three types of stimuli, had different duration depending upon stimulus type. The last microstate (Microstate 6, yellow
bar) was identical for T, Usc and Tsc. It was markedly different for U (see text). B. Segmentation maps of the two microstates (Microstates 4, blue;
Microstate 5, green, upper part of the column) that showed different duration according to the presented stimulus type. The lower panel of the
column shows segmentation map of Microstate 6 (pink) that is specific for the case of U class of stimuli. C. The statistical significance of Microstate 4
and 5 was tested by means of a fitting procedure based on the spatial correlation between microstates obtained from the group-averaged VEPs and
the single-subject VEP data. Blue columns: Microstate 4. Note the prolonged activation for grasping actions (U and T) with respect to those for simple
contact actions (Usc and Tsc). Green columns: Microstate 5. Note the prolonged responses for Usc and Tsc than for U and T. Error bars indicate
standard deviation. Asterisks indicate significant differences (*, p,0.05; **, p,0.01) between conditions for a given map observation. D. Localization
of the intracranial brain generators as estimated with LORETA inverse solution. Twelve brain transverse sections are presented (z coordinates as in
Figure 2). The localizations are framed with the same color as the corresponding microstates in A. Group-averaged sources estimations were
calculated over each time interval and all conditions. E. Segmentation maps of the all microstates. Conventions as in B.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012160.g003
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period from 210–230 ms (F(3, 57)=4.11, p=0.01). Its duration
was identical for both of these classes. Microstate 4 was followed
by a microstate, Microstate 5 (from 232–280 ms, Figure 3A green
bars) that, although present during processing of all four classes of
stimuli, had a significantly much shorter duration for U and T
than for Usc and Tsc (F(3, 57)=3.23, p=0.03). The following
microstate, Microstate 6 (from 282–450 ms, Figure 3A pink bars)
was only present during the processing of use grip (U). The
processing of the other three classes of stimuli was characterized by
a microstate, Microstate 7 (from 282–500 ms, Figure 3A yellow
bars), significantly different from Microstate 6 (F(3, 57)=8.53;
p,0.001).
The segmentation maps of Microstates 4, 5 and 6, revealed by
the topographic pattern analysis for each one of the four classes of
stimuli are shown in Figure 3B (blue, green and pink frames,
respectively). The reliability of these microstates at the group-
averaged level was assessed at the individual level using a fitting
procedure (Figure 3C).
Next, we estimated the active intracranial generators of every
microstate described above in the ‘‘Context’’ condition (Figure 3D)
using the distributed source inverse solution LORETA. The
estimations of group-averaged brain sources were calculated over
each time period (Microstates 1–7) and class of stimuli (U, T, Usc,
and Tsc). Figure 3D shows brain transverse sections displaying the
local source density maxima, localized within a larger activation
cerebral network observed for each microstate.
During Microstate 1 (Figure 3D, pale gray frame) LORETA
distributed source inverse solution revealed a bilateral activation of
the occipital, posterior temporal, and inferior parietal cortices with
a left-lateralized current source density maximum (current source
density maximum: 249, 273, 12 x, y, z mm Talairach
coordinates). A qualitative visual inspection of these data revealed
an additional activation in the anterior part of the right superior
temporal sulcus (57, 244, 17 x, y, z; Talairach coordinates) in
Microstate 1. Microstate 2 (Figure 3D, dark grey frame) was
characterized by a left-lateralized current source density maximum
(current source density maximum: 29, 284, 1 x, y, z; Talairach
coordinates). A qualitative visual inspection of this Microstate 2
revealed a marked decrease of activations of the right hemisphere
in comparison with those observed in Microstate 1. To statistically
validate whether this qualitative decrease of activation in the right
hemisphere was significantly different between Microstate 2 and
Microstate 1, we conducted a paired t-test over the possible 3005
brain solution points (see Method section for further details). More
precisely, we contrasted the scalar values from the source
estimations over the 0–120 ms period (i.e., time period of
Microstate 1) for each participant (N=20 participants) with the
scalar values from the source estimations over the 122–170 ms
period (i.e., Microstate 2 time period) for each participant (N=20
participants) using a paired t-test (Bonferroni-corrected). We
applied a brain solution point-level significance threshold of
t19$2.09 (p#0.05) and a cluster threshold of .10 contiguous
activated brain solution points. As expected, estimated sources in
right posterior STS were significantly stronger (t=3.40) in
Microstate 1 period of time as opposed to Microstate 2 period
of time.
LORETA estimation of the active intracranial generators of the
next microstate (i.e., Microstate 3, Figure 3D, orange frame)
presented an activation pattern similar to that of the previous one
(i.e., Microstate 2) with a left-lateralized current source density
maximum (current source density maximum: 249, 267, 17 x, y,
z; Talairach coordinates). Visual inspection of Microstate 3 (in
comparison with Microstate 2) revealed a marked decrease of
occipital activations and, conversely an increase of those located in
the left temporal and inferior parietal cortices. To statistically
validate whether (or not) these qualitative modulations of brain
activation were significantly different between Microstate 3 and
Microstate 2, we contrasted the scalar values from the source
estimations over the time period of Microstate 3 for each
participant with the scalar values from the source estimations
over the time period of Microstate 2 for each participant over the
possible 3005 brain solution points (using a paired t-test;
Bonferroni-corrected). As previously, we applied a brain solution
point-level significance threshold of t19$2.09 (p#0.05) and a
cluster threshold of .10 contiguous activated brain solution
points. Estimated sources confirmed a significant decrease of
occipital activations (t=2.98) and a significant increase of
activations in the left temporal (t=5.11) and inferior parietal
(t=4.98) cortices in Microstate 3 period of time as opposed to
Microstate 2 period of time. For Microstate 4 (Figure 3D, blue
frame) LORETA distributed source inverse solution showed a
current source density maximum in the left inferior parietal lobules
(current source density maximum: 254, 261, 11 x, y, z; Talairach
coordinates). Visual inspection of the other neural generators
found in Microstate 4 suggested that, unlike Microstate 3,
activations, although weak, were present also in the right
hemisphere (posterior temporal and inferior parietal cortices),
and bilaterally in the frontal lobe. To statistically validate these
visual observations, we contrasted the scalar values from the
source estimations over the time period of Microstate 4 for each
participant with the scalar values from the source estimations over
the time period of Microstate 3 for each participant over the
possible 3005 brain solution points (using a paired t-test;
Bonferroni-corrected). Estimated sources confirmed significantly
stronger activations in the right posterior temporal (t=3.13) and
inferior parietal areas (t=2.46) in Microstate 4 compared to
Microstate 3. Although significantly stronger activations were
present bilaterally in the frontal lobe in Microstate 4 (compared to
Microstate 3), these activations did not pass our cluster threshold
of .10 contiguous activated brain solution points (right frontal
activations: t=3.26 with 6 activated solution points; left frontal
activations: t=2.67 with 3 activated solution points). Finally, this
statistical analysis also revealed stronger activation in the left
lingual gyrus in Microstate 3 compared to Microstate 4 (t=2.87).
Asshown on Figure3D,Microstate 5 revealed a markeddiffusion
of activations to the right hemisphere (Figure 3D, green frame),
though a local current source density maximumremained in the left
hemisphere (current source density maximum: 248, 262, 7 x, y, z
mm Talairach coordinates). A paired t-test (Bonferroni-corrected)
contrasting the scalar values from the source estimations over the
time period of Microstate 5 for each participant with the scalar
values from the source estimations over the time period of
Microstate 4 for each participant reinforced these results. Estimated
sources were stronger in the right hemisphere (t=2.65) in the
superior temporal and inferior parietal areas in the Microstate 5
time period in comparison with the Microstate 4 time period.
Stronger left-lateralized brain activations were also observed in
Microstate 4 compared to Microstate 5 (t=5.15 in left posterior
superior temporal sulcus and lateral temporo-parieto-occipital
area). As mentioned above the final microstate showed a significant
different topographical pattern of activation (Microstate 6) during
processing of U class of stimuli with respect to the processing of T,
Usc, and Tsc classes (Microstate 7). Microstate 6 was significantly
different from Microstate 7(F(3, 57)=8.53; p,0.001). In the case of
U class of stimuli (Microstate 6, Figure 3D, pink frame) LORETA
distributed source inverse solution revealed a right hemispheric
current source density maximum in the parieto-temporal areas
Understanding Intentions
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coordinates). Incontrast,the Microstate 7 presentinT,Uscand Tsc
(Figure 3D, yellow frame) showed a left-lateralized current source
density maximum in the orbito-frontal cortex (current source
density maximum: 23, 33, 212 x, y, z mm Talairach coordinates).
Discussion
The aim of the present experiment was to study the temporal
dynamics of cortical activations during the observation of hand
actions in individuals that were instructed to understand the
intention of an agent interacting with objects. The technique
adopted was a high-density electrical neuroimaging.
The results showed a complex but very consistent pattern of
activations. In both ‘‘No Context’’ and ‘‘Context’’ conditions, the
electrical neuroimaging analysis revealed four major steps: 1) a
diffuse bilateral posterior cortical activations (Microstate 1, 0–
120 ms in ‘‘No Context’’ and ‘‘Context’’ conditions); 2) a marked
activation in the left posterior temporal and inferior parietal
cortices with almost a complete disappearance of activations in the
right hemisphere (Microstate 2, 122–200 ms in ‘‘No Context’’
condition; Microstates 2–3, 122–208 ms in ‘‘Context’’ condition);
3) a significant increase of activation of the right temporo-parietal
region (Microstates 3 and 4 in the ‘‘No Context’’ condition;
Microstates 4 and 5 in ‘‘Context’’ condition) in addition of the
simultaneously co-active left hemispheric sources, plus a discrete
bilateral frontal activation. In this step the duration of microstates
differed depending on the intentional transparency of the motor
acts: the observation of grasping objects for use and transport
determined a more prolonged activations than touching objects
and the same occurred for use grip relative to transport grip; 4) a
significant global decrease of cortical activity. During this last step
(with the exception of ‘‘Context’’ condition, use grip, where a
pattern similar to that of step 3 persisted) an activation of the
orbito-frontal cortex occurred. This activation could be related to
an internal reward due to task accomplishment. However, because
this late effect is outside the main purpose of this study it will be
not considered further in the discussion.
What might be the explanation of this dynamic pattern of
activations? What cognitive processes does it reflect? A precise
response to this question is obviously very difficult. However, a
theoretical analysis of the processes necessary for the comprehen-
sion of agent’s intentions and the extant brain imaging and clinical
data on the functional properties of the cortical areas active in the
present study allow one to formulate some precise hypotheses.
Broadly speaking, there are two main ‘‘computational’’
processes that ought to take place to understand the agent’s motor
intention in a task as that of the present experiment: a) the
recognition of the observed motor acts and its relation with the
object semantics, i.e., what the agent is doing (e.g. ‘‘the cup is
grasped by its handle with a precision grip’’); b) the comprehension
of why the cup is grasped in that specific way (e.g.‘‘ the agent
grasping the cup to drink’’). These two processes, although strictly
related, occur, at least in part, serially. If the motor act is not
analyzed, the intention behind it cannot be understood.
Let us now examine how the temporal dynamics of the cortical
activations found in the presented study fits with recognition
processes.
Left hemisphere activity and its role in motor act
understanding
The first striking event in the temporal dynamics of activations
leading to intention understanding is the occurrence, after an
initial bilateral activation (step 1), of activation of the left hemisphere
(step 2). How can this left dominance be explained?
Left hemisphere is the hemisphere specifically involved in action
organization. This notion goes back to Liepmann (1900), who first
showed that damage to the left inferior parietal lobule and/or the
left premotor cortex produces higher-order motor deficits known
as apraxias [52], the symptomatology of which (e.g. ideational
apraxia, ideomotor apraxia, mielokynetic apraxia, buccofacial
apraxia) varies according to the sector of the parieto-frontal
network that is damaged [53,54].
Some patients with ideomotor apraxia also present deficits in
action recognition [55,56]. In this regard particularly interesting is
a recent study by Pazzaglia et al. (2008). These authors examined
the capacity of patients with limb or buccofacial ideomotor
apraxia to recognize hand and mouth action-related sound [57].
They found that patients with limb apraxia were impaired in
recognizing hand action-related sounds, while those with bucco-
facial apraxia has difficulty in recognized the sound of mouth
actions. Lesion mapping revealed that crucial for recognizing the
sound of limb movements was the left parieto-frontal cortex, while
the left inferior frontal gyrus and the adjacent insular cortex were
causatively associated with recognition of bucco-facial-related
action sounds. This double dissociation indicates that a left-
lateralized network is actively involved not only in execution but
also in comprehension of limb and mouth actions (parieto-frontal
mirror network).
Left hemisphere dominance in action observation is in accord
with a large number of brain imaging studies showing prevalence
of this hemisphere during the observation of object-directed motor
acts [58,59,60,61,62]. In line with this is also a study carried out on
a split-brain patient. By using transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) of motor cortex, Fecteau et al. (2005) found that, during
action observation, the tested split-brain patient showed an
enhanced excitability of the left hemisphere, while no enhance-
ment was observed following stimulation of the right one [63].
It is worth noting that bilateral activation of the parieto-frontal
mirror circuit during the observation and imitation of finger
movements was reported in an fMRI study by Aziz-Zadeh et al.
[64,65]. It is likely, however, that these findings are due to the type
of motor behavior investigated. There is evidence that in humans
there are two different motor networks endowed with the mirror
mechanism [66,67]. One encodes the observed movements
independently of the motor act of which they are part
[68,69,70,71], the other encodes the goal of the observed motor
acts independently of how this goal is achieved [72,73,74]. It is
plausible that the mirror networks encoding movements and
motor acts are not equally lateralized. While, the former is likely
bilateral, the latter is localized to the left hemisphere.
In conclusion, these data indicate that the activation of the left
inferior parietal lobule is likely due to the encoding the observed
motor act on motor ‘‘engrams’’ present in this cortical region. In
virtue of the mirror mechanism, this encoding allows the
individual to recognize what the agent is doing. As for the
concomitant left temporal lobe activation, it is very likely that it is
due to the processing of the semantics of objects acted upon. To
this regard there is evidence from fMRI experiments that the
processing of the semantics of inanimate objects that can be
manipulated (tools in particular) is influenced by their pragmatic
properties and, as a consequence, is localized in the left temporal
lobe [75].
From left to right hemisphere
The next step in intention understanding process (step 3) is the
most complex and intriguing. During this step the activation of the
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accompanied by a progressively more and more intense activation
of the right hemisphere. This step consists of two Microstates, the
first (Microstate 3 ‘‘No Context’’ and Microstate 4 ‘‘Context’’
conditions) characterized by an initial rather weak right hemi-
sphere activation, the left hemisphere being still prevalent; the
second (Microstate 4 ‘‘No Context’’ and Microstate 5 ‘‘Context’’
conditions) during which the right hemisphere activation becomes
full fledged.
It is likely that step 3 reflects cortical activations related to
intention understanding. There are two sets of arguments in favor of
this proposal. The first is based on the activation pattern observed
in the present study; the second derives from brain imaging data
(see below) in which attempts have been done to localize the
mechanisms responsible for intention understanding.
In the ‘‘No Context’’ condition, the observation of the two
motor acts having a transparent goal (use and transport grip) was
characterized by a more prolonged topographical pattern
(Microstate 3; p=0.03; see Figure 2C) with a left-lateralized
current source density maximum in the inferior parietal lobule
(249, 263, 17 x, y, z; Talairach coordinates; Figure 2D) than the
observation of the intentionally opaque simple contact. Converse-
ly, the observation of a simple touch produced a more prolonged
activation in the next brain state (Microstate 4) than the
observation of use grip, and, the observation of the touch grip a
longer activation relative to transport grip (p=0.009; see
Figure 2C). This specific brain sate (Microstate 4) was character-
ized by a left-lateralized current source density maximum in the
inferior parietal lobule and also with significantly stronger right
hemispheric activations in the inferior parietal and superior
parietal areas than in Microstate 3 (see Figure 2D). Although we
cannot exclude that different conditions are explained by different
brain generators, the most plausible interpretation of the
difference in the duration of Microstate 3 is due to the amount
of motor information contained in grasping relative to simple
contact. During grasping observation, the processing of motor
information leading to goal understanding requires more time
because of the complexity of the observed grip and its relation with
the object. This time-consuming operation does not occur in the
case of simple contact, because the goal understanding here does
not require a detailed analysis of the motor aspects of the hand-
object interaction.
This proposal also accounts for the difference in time between
different types of stimuli in the next microstate (Microstate 4). It is
plausible that more detailed is the description of an observed
motor act, less time is required to understand the motor intention
behind it. The brief right hemisphere activation during the
processing of transparent motor act could reflect this fact. This
hypothesis is corroborated by a comparison of the two grip
conditions: the shorter time for processing use grip relative to
transport grip should reflect the congruence between the semantics
of the observed object and its use, a congruence lacking in the case
of an unspecific motor act as transport grip. In contrast, when, as
in the case of simple contact, the motor act is poorly related to the
object, the time for trying to understand the agent’s intention
become longer, requiring a more sophisticated analysis of the
visual scene and possibly (see below) the involvement of inferential
processing.
The results obtained in the ‘‘Context’’ condition support this
interpretation of the two microstates. Also in the ‘‘Context’’
condition there was a longer duration of the Microstate 4 (the first
state showing difference in activation between different classes of
stimuli; p=0.01; see Figure 3A–C) and a briefer duration of the
Microstate 5 for grasping motor acts relative to simple contact
actions (p=0.03; see Figure 3C). The main difference with the
‘‘No Context’’ condition was that the use and transport grasping
did not differ in time in either microstate. The most likely reason
for this was that, unlike in the ‘‘No Context’’ condition, in the
‘‘Context’’ condition the relevant cue for understanding the
agent’s intention was not the hand-grip but the specific context in
which the motor act was performed, and, as one can see from
Figure 1, the two contexts did not differ in their complexity as well
in their significance for intention understanding.
Finally, during the observation of use grip in the ‘‘Context’’
condition there was a prolonged late activation in the right
hemisphere. A possible explanation of this finding is that when the
action processing is based on both the use grip and use context,
there is a further amplification of the activity in the right
hemisphere which might reflect the elaboration by the observer of
possible reasons behind agent’s intentions.
Although the results of the present study cannot exclude some
role of the left hemisphere in intention understanding, they clearly
indicate that the right hemisphere plays an important role in this
function. This conclusion has been recently supported by a study,
prompted by the results of the present experiment, carried out on
a split-brain patient [76]. This patient was tested in two conditions:
‘‘means inference’’ task and ‘‘intention inference’’ task. In both
tasks stimuli similar to those of the present study were used, but in
one the patient was required to guess if the means of the observed
act was correct, in the other if the intention was correct. The
responses were done either with the right hand (left hemisphere) or
the left hand (right hemisphere). Results from this split-brain
patient showed a left hemisphere dominance for understanding
‘‘what’’ is done and a right hemisphere dominance for
understanding ‘‘why’’ an action is carried out.
These findings are in line with previous fMRI data by Iacoboni
et al. (2005) and Hamilton and Grafton (2008). The first study
showed activation of the right frontal node of the mirror network in
volunteers required to recognize the intention of an agent on the
basis of the context in which the action was performed [20], the
other, using the repetition suppression paradigm, demonstrated
that both parietal and frontal nodes of the right hemisphere mirror
network are involved in motor intention understanding [21].
The inverse solution of source localization on which our study is
based allows us only an approximate anatomical cortical
localization of the activations. Thus, we cannot assert whether
the right temporo-parietal activations observed in our study during
intention understanding includes only centers endowed with
mirror mechanism (plus the temporal areas involved in object
description) or also other temporal areas devoid of this
mechanism. In this respect is important to note that there is
evidence that the observation of other’s actions, in particular when
they are unusual or non-stereotypical, might determine, in
addition to the activation of the mirror network, the activation
of the posterior part of the right superior temporal sulcus (pSTS)
[13,14,16]. The activation of the right STS in ‘‘unusual’’
conditions could be due to a division of labor between the two
hemispheres according to the type of visual stimuli that is
analyzed. While typical effector-object interactions are processed
by the left hemisphere, the processing of uncommon interactions
lacking specific motor engrams in the parieto-frontal mirror
networks, is function of the right pSTS.
Conclusion
The notion that the right hemisphere is involved in motor
intention understanding, regardless of whether through the mirror
mechanism or higher- order visual mechanisms, may have also
interesting implications for the comprehension of the relation
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mentalizing processes by means of which the observer attribute to
others specific mental states. Over the last few years, fMRI studies
suggested that specific parts of the right hemisphere and in
particular the right parieto-temporal junction (TPJ) are critically
involved in belief [11,77] and agency [78] attribution. Keeping
this in mind, the prevalence of right hemisphere in motor intention
understanding, especially in the case of actions whose intention is
not transparent and might require reasoning for decipher it, could
be the bridge linking motor act recognition with higher-order
mentalizing processes such as belief and agency attribution.
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